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Art. 493, para. 1 of the Insurance Code explicitly regulates the following compensation for non-pecuniary damages: “The insurer under the compulsory Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) insurance shall cover the insured’s liability for third party injury or damage, including pedestrians, cyclists and other road users, and damage resulting from the possession or use of a motor vehicle while in motion or stopped”. Art. 493, para. 1, item 1 of the Insurance Code regulates that in the above cases the insurer shall cover non-pecuniary damage due to bodily injury or death.

There are two ways to claim compensation for traffic accident-related non-pecuniary damages from a Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) insurer – through judicial and extrajudicial settlements. The limitation period for commencing legal proceedings to bring a compensation claim is five (5) years from the date of the accident. A prerequisite for bringing a claim in court is that the injured party first claims compensation from the insurer within 3 months of the insured event, which is actually the out-of-court remedy. Immediately thereafter, the insurer may refuse to pay compensation or fail to decide on the claim within the statutory time limit, or the injured party may disagree with the compensation amount offered. Only then does the injured party have the right to pursue a claim in court.

Most insurers are willing to offer an out-of-court settlement relying on the fact that the injured party is usually not familiar with the option of obtaining compensation in case law. Insurers often offer compensation that is minimal in view of the particular non-pecuniary damage the injured party has suffered. Once such out-of-court settlement has been made, in most cases it is the main reason for a subsequent court’s decision rejecting a claim for higher compensation. This above is expressly proclaimed by the Supreme Court of Cassation in its Decision No 158/01.02.2021 in Lawsuit No 2569/2019, which states that “The injured party’s satisfaction and statement that the injured party considers the compensation received to be consistent with the amount of the relevant non-pecuniary and/or pecuniary damage the injured party has suffered shall be considered as extinguishing the injured party’s right to seek alternative compensation. The injured party, as a party to an out-of-court settlement, is bound by the injured party’s out-of-court agreement to be fully compensated by payment of the compensation agreed in the out-of-court settlement. The receipt of compensation fulfils the purpose of the insurance indemnity to compensate the injured party for the loss suffered.”

You will need to obtain a set of documents in order to be legally able to make a claim or seek out-of-court compensation from the insurer. The Traffic Accident Report (drafted by the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior) is essential when people were injured in the traffic accident. Other documents which may also be necessary, depending on the specific situation, include a document for the emergency medical aid provided, an outpatient sheet for a medical check-up by a specialist, and/or a medical discharge summary, and an inventory of damage.

It is of the utmost importance for non-pecuniary damages to state what facts and circumstances are taken into account when determining the compensation amount. Art. 52 of the Obligations and Contracts Act regulates that “Compensation for non-pecuniary damage shall be determined by the court in equity” Here the following question arises – what is to be understood by “equity”? The answer can be found in the established and long-standing case-law settled by the Plenum of the Supreme Court in its Decree No 4 of 23 December 1968: “The court’s assessment needs to be based on any and all the circumstances relevant to the amount of the damage, namely the assessment of a number of specific and objectively existing circumstances, such as the nature of the injury, the manner in which it occurred, the circumstances in which it occurred, any further deterioration of the health status, moral suffering caused, mutilations, defacement injuries, etc.”.

The compensation amount for non-pecuniary damage in an out-of-court procedure will be set by an insurance expert committee at the insurance company. For example, the compensation amount for fractured limbs or pelvis will depend mainly on a number of factors, namely: recovery period; any surgical operations; age of the person injured, etc. When setting the compensation amount, it is also necessary to take into account any negative consequences affecting the injured party or their relatives in personal, professional, social and psychological terms.

In the event of a fatality in a traffic accident, the compensation amount due and payable to the deceased’s relatives will depend primarily on their kinship with the deceased person prior to their death, and how the deceased’s death has affected their lives.

The extent of the injuries is determined according to the legal definitions of severe, medium and light bodily harm, as set out in the Articles 128, 129 and 130 of the Penal Code Any case in which the injured party has suffered medium or severe bodily harm is more specific – with penal initiated against the perpetrator. Claiming compensation for traffic accident-related non-pecuniary damages from the insurer may also be made before the penal proceedings have been finalized. In order to do so, it will be necessary to establish exactly how the accident occurred beyond any doubt.

 

If you have been injured in a car accident and are seeking compensation, we can assure you that you can fully rely on our legal assistance in obtaining the most satisfactory possible compensation for non-pecuniary damages.

The Supreme Court of Cassation has adopted the following Interpretative Decision, which partly states that “to have the limitation period under Article 116(a) of the Obligations and Contracts Act suspended, the debtor’s statement, or act which shows the acknowledgement of the claim, will have to be addressed to the creditor or to a creditor’s representative in such a manner that, in the given circumstances, will normally ensure that the acknowledgement will come to the creditor’s attention”.

 

The need for decreeing this Decision was highlighted by Interpretative Lawsuit No 4/2019 of the General Assembly of the Civil and Commercial Chambers (GACCC) of the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC). The Lawsuit concerns a dispute between a bank and an insurer as to whether the limitation period for the bank’s claims was suspended or expired, given that the claims had been acknowledged by the insurer in its own statement to a third party. The Supreme Court Justices were split over the verdict – one group were of the opinion that in order to have the limitation period suspended, it was necessary that the debt acknowledgement be made to the creditor, while the other group held that it did not matter to whom the debt acknowledgement was made, i.e., it may be made to any third party, and that the limitation period was suspended, provided that such acknowledgement was in effect.

 

The Interpretative Decision has flatly adopted the first opinion – that the debt acknowledgement should be addressed to the creditor or a creditor’s representative, however, it hsd emphasised that “the debtor’s statement, or act which shows the acknowledgement of the claim, will have to be addressed to the creditor or to a creditor’s representative in such a manner that, in the given circumstances, will normally ensure that the acknowledgement will come to the creditor’s attention”. The Decision does not provide details of the manner which will normally ensure that the acknowledgement will come to the creditor’s attention, and it is apparently expected that case law will provide an answer in future cases.

 

At the beginning of the Interpretative Decision, the Supreme Court of Cassation has specified what is to be understood by the acknowledgement of the claim pursuant to Article 116(a) of the Obligations and Contracts Act: “A statement of a certifying nature or an act of the holder of the obligation by which the latter confirms to a creditor, categorically and unequivocally, the existence of a specific obligation which has not yet been fulfilled” For this reason, the limitation period will be suspended and the debtor will lose the debtor’s right to plead the expiry of the limitation period. The acknowledgement itself “may be expressly made (albeit without any requirement of form) or made by implied acts, however, the acknowledgement should be, at the time it is made, a clear and unequivocal statement by the debtor regarding the existence of a specific debt”.

 

As for how the debt acknowledgement should be addressed, it does not have to be necessarily made in the presence of the creditor. The Supreme Court Justices have added that: “suspending the limitation period under Article 116(a) of the Obligations and Contracts Act shall be any act of the debtor which in itself clearly and unequivocally manifests the debtor’s awareness of the existence of the debt, if the manner and the circumstances in which it is made imply by their nature that the acknowledgement will come to the creditor’s attention”.

 

The majority of the Supreme Court Justices at the Supreme Court of Cassation agree that “in view of the relative nature of the legal relationship and in so far as the existence of a dispute regarding the debt or otherwise is relevant only to the counterparty to the legal relationship, it logically follows that the statement or act for the acknowledgment is directed to the creditor or a creditor’s representative”.

 

It is also argued that “any other statement about the existence of a specific debt made to a third party, which is devoid of the debtor’s intention for the acknowledgement to come to the creditor’s attention, is only a statement of a fact that is disadvantageous to the debtor, which in itself, however, cannot cause the limitation period to be suspended pursuant to Article 116(a) of the Obligations and Contracts Act”.

Moreover, the day of receipt of the statement, including the moment the statement comes to the creditor’s attention, is of no legal significance for the suspension of the limitation period. The starting point for the suspension of the limitation period is the actual statement or act of the debtor in which the acknowledgement is made.

Furthermore, the majority of the Supreme Court Justices that took part in decreeing this Interpretative Decision emphasise that the creditor bears the burden of proving the fact of and the time when the acknowledgement was made, as well as the circumstances from which it can be inferred that the debtor’s statement or act was addressed to the creditor or a creditor’s representative.

The Interpretative Decision was signed with a dissenting opinion by six Supreme Court Justices, upholding the view that the debt acknowledgement do not necessarily have to be addressed to the creditor, with reference to the mandatory provision of Article 116(a) of the Obligations and Contracts Act, which mandatory provision imposes no additional conditions

The Act amending the Labour Code (LC) was promulgated in the State Gazette, issue # 62 Чрез него се транспонират две директиви на ЕС, които засягат трудовите права на работниците и служителите. This introduces into Bulgarian law the requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/1152 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union, and of Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers.

Part of the changes are related to:

• 1) Overcoming the absolute ban on concluding an employment contract with another employer;
• 2) The employee’s ability to unilaterally propose amendments to the employment contract;
• 3) A flexibility requirement for the employees in balancing work and family responsibilities;
• 4) An individual right of the father (or adoptive parent) to parental leave for raising a child up to 8 years of age;
• 5) Introduction of a maximum probationary period for fixed-term contracts;
• 6) The employer’s obligation to comply with the new rules for ensuring transparent working conditions, etc

There used to be a complete ban on additional work for another employer prior to the amendments. An exception to the rule has now been introduced, whereby an employee is entitled to conclude employment contracts with other employers for work which is outside his/her established working hours under his/her main employment relationship, unless a ban is agreed in his/her individual employment contract under his/her main employment relationship relating to the protection of business secrets and/or the prevention of conflicts of interest (Article 111 of the Labour Code).

The next change concerns the employee’s right to propose in writing a change in the employment relationship – for example, a move from a fixed-term to an open-ended employment contract, or from part-time to full-time employment (Article 119 of the Labour Code). If the employer refuses, the employer will need to provide a reasoned written reply.

New rights granted to employees to reconcile work and family duties are also regulated (Article 167b) In this case, employees who, for example, have a child up to the age of 8 or are caring for close relatives for medical reasons may propose to the employer a temporary modification of the duration and distribution of working time, switching to remote work, and other modifications of the employment relationship that balance work and family duties. If the employer disagrees, the employer’s refusal will again need to be in writing and well substantiated.

There are also new rules that regulate the individual right of the father (or adoptive parent) to parental leave for raising a child up to 8 years of age, with the right to a monetary benefit from the state social insurance in the amount of BGN 710 per month. The parental leave in question is 2 months and may be taken by the father (or adoptive parent) as a one-time leave or in parts until the child reaches the age of 8 The prerequisite for this leave is to have any unused leave for pregnancy and childbirth transferred from the mother’s for raising a child up to the age of 2 or for adoption of a child up to the age of 5.

So far the probationary period in an employment contract has been up to six months. Now, where the employment contract for a certain work assigned to the employee is for a fixed term of less than one year, the probationary period may not exceed one month (Article 70 of the Labour Code).

Prior to these amendments, whenever there was a change in the employment relationship, the employer had to provide the relevant information at the earliest opportunity or within one month after the change at the latest. Now the employer is obliged to provide the employee with written information containing details of the changes made by the time the changes take effect at the latest.

New employer’s obligations to inform employees have also been introduced: familiarisation with the internal rules on salaries; provision of information on the conditions and procedures for termination of the employment contract under the Labour Code (LC), as well as information on employer-provided training related to maintaining and improving professional qualifications and professional skills.

Please do not hesitate to contact our team If you have any queries so that we could suggest a legal option to resolve your employment dispute.

The bill to amend the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) provides for a number of changes, focusing primarily on the introduction of the electronic form in the order for payment procedure. The difference with the previous procedure is that now the creditor may exercise the creditor’s rights entirely electronically, through an electronic application that will be made available on the Single e-Justice Portal. In addition to the said application, both a warrant of execution and a writ of execution will be issued online.

 

There is also an exception that covers the range of applicants who are not traders, or are not represented by a lawyer, i.e. the submission of an application in writing to the court. In debtor’s favor (whenever the debtor exercises their rights), an objection to an already issued warrant of execution may be filed again in writing in any district court.

 

Another advantage is that every district court in the country will consider applications for the issuance of a warrant of execution, which in itself is a guarantee of the efficiency and speed of the order for payment procedure.

 

The upcoming changes in the Civil Procedure Code provide for a relatively relaxed regime for proving claims and shorter terms for considering claims. This amendment will definately reduce the workload of individual courts, especially that of the Sofia District Court (SDC) where a civil lawsuit usually takes twice as long as compared to the district courts in the other larger towns.

 

The main objectives of the bill are to hugely facilitate citizens’ access to justice by creating effective rules for remote access to court, in addition to easing the uneven workload of the courts, and to bring the fees down, making the order for payment procedure at the court even more efficient and affordable.

 

Currently the Art. 417 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that a creditor having a valid document based on which the creditor can obtain an immediate warrant of execution must first submit a written application to the relevant district court at the debtor’s permanent address. . This provision explicitly states the documents based on which the court will issue an immediate warrant of execution – such as, for example, a contract with notarized signatures, a promissory note, an extract from accounting books.

 

If you have a claim but you are not sure which is the most appropriate manner to assert your rights as a creditor, you can trust our team to treat your case with the utmost care and legal expertise.

Amendments to the Family Code (FC) that concern paternity disputes, and more specifically disputing paternity by third parties, were made at the end of 2020. The legislator has introduced a new provision that allows any third party claiming to be a child’s biological father to contest paternity within one year of learning of the child’s birth. The legislator has explicitly stated that when issuing a decree, the court shall be guided, first and foremost, by the child’s best interest.

The Constitutional Court has recently ruled on this issue with a decree in a lawsuit that was brought by the Ombudsman Prof. Diana Kovacheva. The lawsuit concerns §5 of the Transitional and Final Provisions of the FC from 2020, and this paragraph states as follows: “For any person for whom the circumstances substantiating the right to claim under Art. 62, para. 1, sentence three, and para. 5, sentence one, were present before the effective date of this law, the terms for bringing the relevant claims shall run from the effective date of this law”.

 

Following the amendments already made, now there are two sets of grounds upon which paternity may be disputed. First of all, according to Art. 62, para. 1, the presumptive father of the child and the mother’s husband may challenge paternity within one year of learning of the child’s birth by proving that the child could not have been conceived by him or if certain “circumstances disproving paternity became known at a later stage for reasons beyond the reasonable control of the claimant, and the claim may be filed up to the expiration of one year from the moment of becoming aware of these circumstances but no later than the child’s coming of age.” The second option is clearly stated in Art. 62, para. 5 of the Family Code, according to which a third person may challenge the presumption of paternity within one (1) year from learning of the child’s birth, and the said third person must necessarily combine this claim with a claim to establish his own paternity, because the third person’s legal interest stems from this. If these claims are joined and if the said third person is not determined to be the father in this lawsuit, both claims will be dismissed, even if the presumptive father is not the real father, to avoid leaving the child without established paternity. The old regulations did not provide legitimate grounds for a third person to bring such claim.

 

The Constitutional Court has expressed its opinion on this matter by approving the recently made amendments to the FC, emphasizing that there is a limitation in presenting both of these claims – the child’s coming of age. This conclusion can be derived from the decree in the lawsuit, which states “Consequently the formal absence of a deadline for exercising the right under §5 Transitional Provisions of the amendmentя of the Family Code in the context of Art. 62, para. 5, sentence one of the Family Code, to which the disputed provision refers to, does not give grounds to accept a not limited by the child’s coming of age possibility of exercising the subjective right by a third person who claims to be the biological father of a person with established presumptive origin.” In other words this means that any male person may dispute the parentage of a child, and the Constitutional Court advocates the view that in this way the legislator will overcome an injustice that was committed in the past before the amendments were made.

 

On the other hand, this gives the possibility that paternity disputes may also affect the interests of other persons who have built a relationship with the child over the years in various forms In this line of thought, the Constitutional Court accepts that: “the court’s obligation to decide the dispute, as established in Art. 62, para. 5 sentence three of the FC, taking into account the ” the child’s best interest”, excludes such possibility”.

 

The overall approach to this speciific issue should be applied selectively by the designated courts, as the reasons for the decisions of the Constitutional Court not expressed in interpretative rulings have no binding force

If you are in a similar situation, you can contact our team to assist you on this matter.

The amendments to the Obligations and Contracts Act (OCA), which were promulgated in the State Gazette, issue # 102 of December 1, 2020, are an instrument amending the statute of limitations (also known as a prescriptive period) and targeted specifically at debtors – natural persons. These amendments became effective on June 1, 2021, drawing great public attention. However, the amendments have provoked some legal experts to express their concerns regarding certain aspects primarily related to their implementation, and especially doubt as to whether the provisions are in tune with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.

Which are the cases when the amendments to the OCA will be applied?

The new Article 112 of the OCA is basically an attempt at introducing an absolute prescription period to be applied to monetary claims against individuals. It provides for that “upon the expiration of the ten-year statutes of limitations, any monetary claims against individuals are extinguished by prescription, regardless of any suspension or interruption of the statutes of limitations, except when the obligation has been deferred or rescheduled”. The interpretation of the Article 112  has been widely perceived as “salvation” for the “eternal debtor”.

Which are the cases when it will not be possible to invoke the Article 112 of the OCA?

It is important to note that the provisions of the Article 112 are not a “panacea” for any and all of the debtor’s obligations. As many as eight cases do not provide for the application of “absolute statutes of limitations”.

Why the new amendments to the OCA have stirred controversy?

In particular, whether the newly introduced statutes of limitations are “absolute” is a topic which many renowned civil law scientists have expressed their opinions about. But, according to some views, the provisions of the Article 112 of the OCA will create more problems than they will solve. Allegedly, both debtors and creditors will be affected. There are opinions according to which the “absolute statutes of limitations” can easily be circumvented meaning that their regulatory provisions will become meaningless.

The fears that § 2 of the Transitional and Final Provisions to the Act amending the OCA will have serious implications have not stayed in the realm of theoretical controversy. At the request of the Supreme Bar Council (SBC), the Constitutional Court have initiated Constitutional Lawsuit № 1/2021 regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the provisions. The provisions being attacked state that “for any existing cases the statutes of limitations under the Article 112 shall run from the day when the obligation becomes due for fulfilment. In case of pending enforcement proceedings, the statutes of limitations shall run from the first enforcement action, and if no enforcement proceedings have been initiated – from the day when the act recognizing the claim becomes effective.” The Supreme Bar Council (SBC) is of the opinion that the “absolute statutes of limitations are given retroactive effect by virtue of § 2 of the Transitional and Final Provisions to the Act amending the OCA, because the ten-year absolute statutes of limitations will start running not from the effective date of the amendments but from a date preceding the effective date, and thus receivables which are currently due will be deemed already extinguished by prescription at a past moment, or a minimum period will be sufficient to allow the receivables to be extinguished. This will be tantamount to “instantaneous” extinguishing by prescription which is intolerable and contradicts the very idea that the prescriptive period is a period of time.”

We will soon find out whether the absolute statutes of limitations have a rescue effect or are more of a trouble for the debtor and the creditor alike. Our team will keep you informed about any news on this topic. Meanwhile, feel free to send us your queries.

Hiring a criminal defense lawyer has multiple benefits and provides you the opportunity to the best possible outcome for your trial.

With its Ruling № 480 of December 11, 2020, the Third Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Cassation ruled that it was lawful to grant a divorce by mutual consent
without the parties going to court.

The Supreme Court of Cassation pointed out that “According to the Art. 330, para. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, in case of a petition for divorce by mutual consent, the spouses shall appear in person at a court hearing According to the Art. 330, para. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, if one of the spouses fails to appear without a valid reason, the case shall be terminated. The personal attendance of the applicants is provided for in view of the Court’s obligation to satisfy itself that the consent to divorce is serious and unwavering. However, this does not preclude applicants from being represented
by express power of attorney, for valid reasons.

The following two preconditions will have to be fulfilled in order for the court to allow the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent and without the parties going to court:

The first precondition is that any party that cannot attend has a “good and valid reason” for not being able to attend in person. A good and valid reason can be proved by presenting relevant evidence, and then it is up to the panel hearing the case to judge if the reason is “good and valid”.

The second precondition is that the party that cannot attend in person has expressly authorized a procedural representative to appear in open court and clearly state the will of that party. It will be sufficient that from the wording of the power of attorney “it is possible to deduce the actual will regarding the agreement”, as “the wording of the agreement does not have to be reproduced word for word in the power of attorney

If it is time for you to end your marriage and you are looking for the right legal approach, you can count on our team for all the assistance required.